NYLS Law Review
Volume 42
Issue 3 SYMPOSIUM: ONE-HUNDREDTH
ANNIVERSARY OF THE CHARTER OF THE CITY
OF NEW YORK: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE,
1898-1998

Article 16

January 1998

THE FRANCHISE AND CONCESSION REVIEW COMMITTEE: THE
MAYOR'S VEHICLE TO CONTROL CITY FRANCHISES
Laura Sulem

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/nyls_law_review
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Laura Sulem, THE FRANCHISE AND CONCESSION REVIEW COMMITTEE: THE MAYOR'S VEHICLE TO
CONTROL CITY FRANCHISES, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1255 (1998).

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion
in NYLS Law Review by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@NYLS.

THE FRANCHISE AND CONCESSION REVIEW COMMITTEE:
THE MAYOR'S VEHICLE TO CONTROL CITY FRANCHISES
I. INTRODUCTION
The Franchise and Concession Review Committee ("FCRC") was
established to review and approve the granting of franchises and
concessions in the City of New York ("City") by the 1989 New York City
Charter ("Charter").' The 1989 Charter replaced an earlier Charter ruled
unconstitutional by United States District Judge Edward R. Neaher due to
a problem with the City's then most powerful governmental body-the
Board of Estimate.2 Judge Neaher found that each borough's equal
representation on the Board of Estimate violated the "one person-one vote"
standard mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution because, regardless of population size, each borough was
represented equally.3
The fundamental restructuring in the 1989 Charter divided and
redistributed the Board of Estimate's powers between the mayor and City
Council ("Council"). Most land-use policy decisions were reassigned to
the Council.'
Land use in the form of franchises, concessions, and
revocable consents,5 however, must ultimately be approved by the FCRC
and separately by the mayor.6 The FCRC's role in any final decision to
grant such land-use proposals represents a significant change from the
system used by the Board of Estimate in that it limits the power of borough
presidents and increases, ultimately, the power of the mayor. 7
Little has been written on the FCRC and the role it plays in granting
City franchises. The goal of this Note is to inform the reader about the
FCRC and its composition, and to describe its responsibility (or lack

thereof) for approving or rejecting proposals for City-granted franchises.

1. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 14 § 373(d)(2) (1989).
2. See Joseph P. Viteritti, The New Charter: Will It Make a Difference?, in URBAN
POLITICS NEW YORK STYLE 413 (Jewel Bellush & Dick Netzer eds., 1990) (discussing
Morris v. Board of Estimate, 647 F. Supp. 1463, 1464 (E.D.N.Y. 1986)).
3. See id.
4. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER REVISION COMM'N, FINAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK
CITY CHARTERREVISION COMMISSION, JAN. 1989-Nov. 1989, at 22-23 (1990) [hereinafter
FINAL REPORT].

5. For a more detailed explanation of these land uses, see infra notes 21-24 and
accompanying text.
6. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 22-23.
7. See Viteritti, supra note 2, at 423-25.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

Part II8 of the Note introduces the FCRC's members. Part 1119 describes
how the FCRC works. Part IV ° expounds on the public's role in decisions
to grant franchises. Part V II compares the current system of granting
franchises under the Charter with the previous system. Part VI 2 discusses
the Coordinated Street Furniture Franchise to illustrate the FCRC's actual
role in a current franchise proposal. Part VII 13 concludes by asserting that
the mayor wields the real power to grant City franchises; although the 1989
Charter alters the procedure for granting franchises, it continues to allow
the mayor to exercise the final decision with respect to granting them. 4
II. THE COMPOSITION OF THE FCRC
The following City officials comprise the FCRC: (1) the mayor, who
acts as the chairperson; (2) the director of the Office of Management and
Budget; (3) corporation counsel; (4) the comptroller; (5) one additional
appointee of the mayor; and (6) the borough president of the borough that
will be affected by the franchise or concession. 5 In the event of more than
one borough being affected, the borough presidents whose interests are at
stake apoint one borough president, or another individual, to represent
them.
Regardless of the number of boroughs affected, the borough
presidents are allowed only one vote. 17 The affirmative vote of five
members is required to approve a franchise. 8
The FCRC's duties include establishing procedures for granting
concessions, determining whether a City agency's proposal for a franchise
is consistent with the authorizing resolution by the City Council, and
reviewing and approving the ultimate selection of each franchise. 1' The
Charter's description of the FCRC's role in land use and the granting of
City franchises seems to indicate that the FCRC's role is rather
substantial. 20 That description, however, is misleading. The FCRC

8. See infra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 21-40 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 55-83 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
14. See Viteritti, supra note 2, at 425.
15. See N.Y. CITY CHARTERREVISION COMM'N, SUMMARY

OF FINAL PROPOSALS

45

(1989).
16. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 14 § 373(a) (1989).
17. See id.
18. See id. § 373(c) (requiring the affirmative vote of four members for any other act).

19. See id. § 373(d).
20. See id.
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actually plays a very small role in the franchise decisions that ultimately
affect every New Yorker.
III. How THE FCRC WORKS
Land use in the city is divided, for the purpose of the Charter, into
three categories-franchises, concessions, and revocable consents.2 ' Both
franchises and concessions are grants, made by a City agency to a private
individual or organization, to use City-owned property. 2 The fundamental
difference between the two is that franchises must provide a public service
while concessions are granted for private use. 3 Accordingly, building bus
stop shelters is considered a franchise activity while maintaining sidewalk
caf6 tables is considered a concession activity. Revocable consents are
grants by the City of a right to use, for example, pipes, conduits, and
tunnels, for a private use, and are-as their name suggests-revocable at
will.24 As stated, this Note is focused on the granting of City franchises.
A franchise proposal is initially subject to approval by the top
executive in city government, the mayor, and by the top legislative body,
the City Council?3 The elimination of the Board of Estimate by the
Charter allows for this structure by creating the classic mayor-council form
of government.26
The process for granting franchises involves not only
the City's legislative and executive bodies, but the general public of the
City of New York as well. The agency with expertise in a particular area,
with the advice of corporation counsel, initially determines the need for a
franchise. The agency then submits a proposed authorizing resolution to
the mayor, which is an administrative document stating the nature of the
franchise, the public service that will be provided, the specific terms of the
franchise, any subsidies that may be given to the franchisee, and the
criteria needed to evaluate proposals submitted by interested franchisees.28
Should the mayor decide to submit the authorizing resolution to the

21.

See id. ch. 14.

22. See id. § 362.
23.
24.

See id.
See id.

25. See id. § 363(b)-(c).
26. See Viteritti, supra note 2, at 421.

27. See N.Y.

CITY CHARTER

ch. 14 § 363(b) (1989). The agency, in making the

determination, is required by the Charter to be advised by corporation counsel and any other
agencies as the mayor deems necessary. See id.
28.

See id.
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Council, the City Record29 must publish the proposal's text and a public
hearing must be held within ninety days.3" The Council then approves,

approves with modifications, or rejects the proposal by majority vote.3'

If the Council approves the resolution, the responsible agency may
issue a Request for Proposal ("RFP") provided the following two events
occur.3 2 First, corporation counsel must determine that the request is
consistent with the authorizing resolution.33 Second, modem concerns
about environmental effects must be addressed-either the Department of

City Planning must determine that the franchise has no land-use impact, or

the request must be approved pursuant to the Uniform Land Use Review
Procedures ("ULURP"). 4
Additionally, a public hearing must be scheduled to discuss the landuse impacts of the proposal unless the community board35 of the community
affected by the franchise waives it when, in its judgment, the franchise does
not involve a substantial land use interest.36 Even if the community board
decides to waive the public hearing, however, the FCRC must hold a
similar public hearing before it can give final approval to the proposed
franchise.37 The FCRC's hearing must occur within thirty days of the
filing of the proposal by the responsible agency.38 Furthermore, the
summary of the terms of the proposal must be published in the City Record
at least fifteen days prior to the hearing, and the notice of the hearing must
be published in both a daily and a weekly newspaper that circulate in the

29. The City Record is a newspaper, published Monday through Friday, that publishes
only those official City matters that are expressly authorized in the Charter. See id. ch. 47
§ 1066.
30. See id. ch. 14 § 363(c).
31. See id. If the Council modifies the proposal, it is subject to mayoral veto and
reconsideration, repassing, and adoption by Council override, in the same way as a local
law. See id.
32. See id. § 363(e).
33. See id.
34. See id. ULURP establishes community consultation procedures for a host of landuse actions. Such procedures involve review of the proposal by the Department of City
Planning, the City Planning Commission, community boards, and the public via public
hearings. See id. ch. 8 § 197(c)(1).
35. Community boards, which consist of not more than 50 persons appointed by the
borough president for staggered terms of two years, are responsible for, inter alia, the
following: considering the needs of the districts they serve; advising public officers about
any matters respecting the welfare of the districts; submitting annual reports to the mayor;
at their discretion, holding public and/or private meetings regarding any matter relating to
the welfare of the districts; and conducting substantial public outreach by maintaining
records of community organizations. See id. ch. 70 §§ 2800(a), (d).
36. See id. ch. 14 § 363(e).
37. See id. § 371.
38. See id. § 371(a).
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boroughs and districts where the franchise will have an effect.39 Finally,
the separate and additional approval of the mayor, notwithstanding the
approval of the FCRC, is required before any franchise agreement takes
effect.40
IV. THE PUBLIC'S ROLE IN FRANCHISE GRANTS

Because the granting of a franchise can affect entire communities
within the city, public input and scrutiny is crucial to the determination of
franchise grants. But how effectively do these franchise procedures include
the public? The Charter mandates that the FCRC hold public hearings
regarding franchises, and extensive regulations exist to publish proposals
and notice of hearings in city newspapers.4" Furthermore, the public elects
the mayor, the members of the Council, and three of the six members of
the FCRC.4 2 These procedural safeguards indicate that franchise grants are
repeatedly open to public forum, debate, and approval.
In addition, the decision to include the public in the new franchise
procedures was itself influenced 43
by members of the public. To illustrate,
the 1987 Ravitch Commission, which many assert initiated the most
44
comprehensive assessment of New York City government in history,
consisted of forty-three staff members who held six public hearings at
which nearly 350 city officials, community representatives, and private
citizens testified. 45 Further, in 1989 the Schwarz Commission held ten
public hearings and two public forums to discuss the new Charter46
provisions, including those legislating land-use determination procedures.
In total, another 200 hours were spent listening to testimony and
commentary from over 800 people, and debates were scrutinized by
members of the news media.47

39. See id. (containing a more detailed explanation of the lengthy, specific notice
requirements mandated by the Charter).

40. See id. § 372(a).
41.

See supra notes 29-30, 35-40 and accompanying text.

42. These members are the mayor, the comptroller, and the borough president(s).
43. This Charter Commission, appointed in response to court invalidation of the Board
of Estimate, was chaired by Richard Ravitch. See 1 N.Y. CITY CHARTER COMM'N, REPORT
OF THE NEW YORK CITY CHARTER COMMISSION: DEC. 1986-Nov. 1988, at 14 (1989)

[hereinafter JANUARY REPORT].

44.
45.
46.
former

See Viteritti, supra note 2, at 419.
See id.
See id. The Schwarz Commission was named after Frederick A. 0. Schwarz,
corporation counsel, whom Mayor Koch appointed to lead the 1989 Charter

Commission.
47.

See id. at 420.
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But despite the public's role in forming the franchise procedures and
the opportunity for the public to participate in franchise decisions under the
Charter, public opinion may not be very influential on any final decision.
For example, an individual's local interest may be trumped by the City's
executive interest, even if that individual voted for both the borough
president and the mayor. The public may have had an opportunity to help
shape franchise procedure, but it is possible that the public will go unheard
in the actual process of granting a franchise. This is true because, although
the public elects key figures who play prominent roles in the decisionmaking of franchise grants, the public's voice is somewhat removed. For
example, a proposal awarded FCRC approval may be approved regardless
of opposition by a borough president and consequently, the borough's
constituents. A more extreme, although concededly rare, example is that
a proposal that affects every borough and is opposed by every elected
borough president could still be approved by the FCRC. Such proposals
may be approved because the borough presidents have only one collective
vote, and a proposal may be approved without that vote (assuming all other
members vote to approve). In contrast, if a franchise affecting every
borough is welcomed by every borough president and wins the48approval of
the FCRC, the mayor still has the absolute power to reject it.
V. THE OLD CHARTER VERSUS THE NEW CHARTER

In fairness, any procedural system created in a democracy will not
ensure that every interested party is ultimately satisfied. How does the
1989 Charter, then, compare to the previous Charter concerning the
process by which the City grants franchises? Under the pre-1989 Charter,
the Board of Estimate had the power to approve franchises. 49 The Board
consisted of three citywide elected officials-the mayor, the comptroller,
and the president of the council (each of whom had two votes), and the five
borough presidents (each of whom had one vote). ° A three-fourths vote
of the Board and separate approval by the mayor was needed to approve a
franchise.51
In regard to land use, then, an important difference and an equally
important similarity exist between the old and new Charters. The

See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 14 §§ 372(a)-(b) (1989).
49. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 7.
50. See JANUARY REPORT, supra note 43, at 14. On March 22, 1989, the Supreme
Court of the United States affirmed lower court rulings and held that the Board of Estimate,
because it gave equal representation to boroughs of dramatically unequal size, violated the
"one person-one vote" standard of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Board of Estimate v.
48.

Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 690 (1986).

51.

See FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 22.
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difference lies in the loss of power suffered by the borough presidents in
the new Charter, and the similarity lies in the mayor's final say in franchise
decisions. In both cases the result is ultimate mayoral power of land use
via franchises.
The following example illustrates the loss of power suffered by the
borough presidents. In March 1992, the FCRC approved, by a four to two
vote, an agreement to hold the Marlboro Grand Prix of New York races
from 1993-2002 in lower Manhattan.52 The two members who voted
against the Grand Prix plan, former Manhattan Borough President Ruth
Messinger and former Comptroller Elizabeth Holtzman, were opposed to
the part of the deal allowing cigarette advertising to decorate the track. 3
Recall that both dissenting members are elected officials. This example
demonstrates how easily a land-use decision can be made despite the
opposition of the borough president and, arguably, the interest of his or her
constituents .
VI. AN ILLUSTRATION: THE COORDINATED STREET FURNITURE
FRANCHISE

Currently, the Department of Transportation ("DOT") is reviewing
proposals for an extremely large City franchise, the Coordinated Street
Furniture Franchise." The grantee of the franchise will be responsible for
building 3,300 bus shelters, at least 30 self-cleaning public toilets, 430
newsstands, pay phones, computer information terminals, and litter bins on
the streets of New York City over the next twenty years. 6 Some bidders
for the proposal have estimated that the advertising revenue earned by
selling space on the public furniture will generate upwards of $1 billion
over the twenty-year term, an incentive for bidders who must agree to pay
the City $100 million to merely submit a proposal to the DOT. 7
The DOT, the agency designated by the mayor as having expertise in
the furniture franchise, issued an RFP on January 17, 1997. 5 1 The seventy-

52. See Joseph Siano, A New York City Auto Race? Look Both Ways, It's Coming,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1992, at Al.
53. See id.
54. Interestingly, and despite the advertising that was allowed at the Grand Prix, in
May 1993 the FCRC approved an agreement banning tobacco advertisements from over
4,000 phone booths on City property. See id.

55. See

CITY OF NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION REQUEST FOR

PROPOSALS, Jan. 17, 1997 [hereinafter DOT RFP].
56. See Wayne Barrett, Sidewalksfor Sale: The GiulianiRush to Builda Billion-Dollar
Boondoggle, VILLAGE VOICE (N.Y.), Apr. 8, 1997, at 27.
57. See id.
58. See DOT RFP, supra note 55.
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seven page request, prepared according to and in compliance with the
franchise-granting procedure, was submitted to the mayor by the DOT.59
After it was published in the City Record and discussed at a public hearing,
the mayor submitted it to the Council, who approved it by a majority
vote. 60 The authorizing resolution of the Council was issued on March 6,
1997.61 Because street furniture will undoubtedly have an immense impact
on land use, the proposal was also approved pursuant to ULURP. 62 The
RFPs were due at the Contracts Division of the DOT by March 21, 1997.63
The DOT has accepted bids and is in the process of selecting a vendor; the
64
proposals being considered are not, however, available for public review.
The Coordinated Street Furniture Franchise RFP is a lengthy document
detailing the franchisee's responsibilities concerning the design,
maintenance, and operation of the furniture. 5 A company or corporation
seeking to become the future franchisee of this project must adhere to very
specific, exacting requirements. Any proposal submitted to DOT must
contain the following: (1) a proposal cover sheet; (2) a statement of
qualifications of the proposer, including a narrative, organizational outline,
and references, names and titles of project team members, and financial
statements of each firm who is a party to the proposal; (3) a technical
proposal, including a narrative, color drawings of each basic structure
design, and scale models of the two basic designs for each structure; (4) a
cash flow analysis; (5) a compensation proposal outlining the amount to be
paid to the City each year; (6) various City documents, such as
questionnaires required under the City's Vendor Information System; and
(7) an acknowledgment that the proposer received each of five addenda
distributed by the DOT prior to the proposal deadline.' An evaluation
committee, consisting of at least three persons deemed qualified to evaluate
the proposals properly, will review all responses to the RFP in five
phases. The RFP states that such qualified persons will probably include
representatives of the DOT, the Department of Design and Construction,
the Department of City Planning, and various technical advisors. 68 FCRC
members are not among those qualified evaluators expected to review the

59. See id.
60. See id.
61.

See THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK RESOLUTION No. 1548, L.U. No.

562-A, in DOT RFP, supra note 55, at 35.
62. See DOT RFP, supra note 55, at 25-28.
63. See id. at 24.
64. I visited the DOT on November 5, 1997 and was told by an employee that, due
to privacy concerns, the proposals are not subject to public perusal.
65. See DOT RFP, supra note 55.
66. See id. at 19-23.
67. See id. at 25.
68. See id.
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responses. 69 A detailed account of the evaluation committee's criteria and
procedures is provided in accordance with the Charter.7" Finally, the
proposers are informed that the franchise contract award will not be
effective until it is the subject of a public hearing, approved by the FCRC,
approved separately by the mayor, and registered with the comptroller. 7'
An important aspect of the Coordinated Street Furniture Franchise is
the inclusion of city newsstands in the proposal. Coinciding with such an
inclusion is Local Law Number 29, effective April 18, 1997.72 This law
mandates that any new newsstands built by the Coordinated Street Furniture
Franchise, other than those built to replace existing newsstands, would be
subject to a competitive bidding system in the selection of the newsstand
operators. 73 As for current operators, they will be able to continue to
operate their existing newsstands, or to operate newsstands built by the
Coordinated Street Furniture franchisee to replace their newsstands, for a
period of five years after enactment of this law. 74 Furthermore, the
licensing fee for current o erators will increase from $538 per year to as
much as $5,000 per year.
Nine months before the expiration of the five-year period, the DOT
commissioner must submit a report to the Council on the effectiveness of
the new newsstand competitive concession program, and the mayor must
submit a separate proposal as to the future operation of newsstands that
continue to be operated by licensees as of the effective date of this law.76
The Council may accept the mayor's proposal, which could call for
competitive bidding after the five-year period. 7 7 Considering Mayor
Giuliani's history and the Revision Commission's goal of maximizing
competition in the selection of franchisees and concessionaires, 78 it is
probable that after the five-year period a competitive system will be put in
place. If the Council rejects the mayor's proposal, on the other hand, and
fails to enact its own alternative, the DOT commissioner "may" ask the
FCRC to approve the continuation or renewal of concessions covering these

69. See id.
70. See id. at 25-28; N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 14 § 363 (1989).
71. See DOT RFP, supra note 55, at 33.
72. See NEWYORK, N.Y., LOC. L. NO. 29 (1997) (amending the administrative code
of the City of New York concerning newsstands).
73. See id. § 1.
74. See id. §2.
75. See Michael Blood, Bad News for NYC Newsstand Operators?, COMMERCIAL
APPEAL (Memphis), July 23, 1997, at A6.
76. See NEW YORK, N.Y., Loc. L. No. 29 § 1 (1997).
77. See id.
78. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER REVISION COMM'N, THE CHAIR'S RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR CHARTER REVISION 30 (1989).
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newsstands.7 9 Thus, the Council effectively has the final say on whether
or not operation of newsstands renovated by the Coordinated Street
Furniture Franchise will be granted by a process of competitive bidding.
Notably, it is only in the unlikely event of a failure to act after
disapproving the mayor's proposal that the FCRC, by default, may be
consulted about allowing current newsstand operators to renew their
concessions and/or licenses. Thus, the Charter removes the FCRC from
important franchise decision making regarding government use of private
sector capabilities.8"
The effect of Local Law Number 29 and the Coordinated Street
Furniture Franchise is that gradually ownership of newsstands will shift
from individual operators to the future franchisee. 8' Attorney Robert
Bookman, general counsel and spokesperson for the New York City
Newsstand Operators Association, which represents most of the city's
current newsstands, was quoted in The Commercial Appeal as saying,
"[o]nce the newsstands are no longer owned by the operators, which will
be happening soon, it's not a big leap from there to say we are going to
have one entity operate all newsstands. 8 2 Nearly 280 of the city's 331
licensed newsstands are in the borough of Manhattan.8 3 This statistic raises
again the issue of borough representation on the FCRC; although
Manhattan newsstands comprise most of the newsstands citywide, a single
representative chosen by all five borough presidents will ultimately share
but one vote on the FCRC, the committee officially designed to review and
ultimately approve or disapprove the Coordinated Street Furniture
Franchise.
The Coordinated Street Furniture Franchise will have an impact on
every New Yorker who rides the bus, buys a paper at the local newsstand,
or uses pay phones. It will also have enormous effects on City land use,
public advertising, and the livelihood of the city's roughly 300 newsstand
operators. At this point, Mayor Giuliani is in control. On selection of a
proposal by the evaluation committee of the DOT, and after a public
hearing on the proposal, the Coordinated Street Furniture Franchise only
needs to be approved by the FCRC before he can approve it.

79. See NEW YORK, N.Y., Loc. L. No.29 § 1 (1997).
80. See E.S. Savas, Considering Privatization,in NEW YORK UNBOUND: THE CITY
AND THE POLITICS OF THE FUTURE 109, 112 (Peter D. Salins ed., 1988).
81. See NEW YORK, N.Y., Loc. L. No.29 (1997).
82. Blood, supra note 75.
83. See Anthony Ramirez, NeighborhoodReport: Upper West Side; Newsstands Go
Downhill,for Now, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 19, 1997, § 13, at 6.
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VII. CONCLUSION
As demonstrated by the Coordinated Street Furniture Franchise
example, the FCRC-always subject to veto by the City's mayor-wields
no real independent power in the granting of City franchises. The alternate
duties performed by the FCRC-such as reviewing procedures that must be
followed by those asking for franchise grants and determining whether a
City agency's proposal is consistent with the RFP for which such
agreement was negotiated 8a-are strictly administrative acts capable of
being performed without the bureaucratic hassle of designating a special
committee and introducing new sections into the City Charter. As was true
before the Board of Estimate was destroyed by our nation's federal courts,
mayoral power over City franchises is stronger than ever.85
Laura Sulem

84.
85.

See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 14 § 373(d) (1989).
See Viteritti, supra note 2, at 419.

